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ABSTRACT
In their attempts to mobilise supporters and justify their actions,
violent religious extremists often refer to parts of scripture that
legitimize violence against supposed enemies of the faith. Accounts
of religious extremism are divided on whether such references to
scripture have genuine motivating and mobilising power. We
investigate whether references to legitimations of violence in
religious scripture can raise support for religious violence by
implementing a survey experiment among 8,000 Christian, Muslim
and Jewish believers in seven countries across Europe, North
America, the Middle East and Africa. We find that priming individuals
with isomorphic pro-violence quotes from Bible, Torah or Quran
raises attitudinal support for religious violence significantly. Effect
sizes are particularly large among those with a fundamentalist
conception of their religion. Our results show that religious scripture
can be effectively used to mobilise support for violence. The findings
thus mark a counterpoint to theoretical arguments that question the
causal role of religion and have important implications for de-
radicalization policies.
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The number of casualties of terrorism worldwide has increased sharply, reaching
almost 200,000 deaths over the ten-year period 2007–2016. In contrast to the 1970s
and 1980s, when ethnic and left-revolutionary groups predominated, global terrorism
more recently has become dominated by groups acting in the name of religion.1 Most
of the deadliest recent terror groups fall in the category of Islamic religious extremism,
most importantly the Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East, the Afghan and Pakistani
Taliban, and Boko Haram in Nigeria and surrounding countries. Attacks by Christian
extremist groups like the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army and the Anti-Balaka
groups in the Central African Republic have also resulted in many casualties. Many
of the deadliest recent terror attacks in the immigration contexts of the United
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States and Western Europe over the last two decades have likewise been committed in
the name of religion. In addition to these terror attacks in Western immigration
countries, thousands of young people have travelled to Syria, Iraq and in smaller
numbers to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya and Somalia to join Islamist terror
groups whose declared aim is to fight on behalf of their religion against supposed
enemies of the faith.
But what is religious about religiously motivated violence? This seemingly simple
question is both hotly contested, and of crucial importance to design effective
counter-strategies. What is not in doubt is that religious extremists claim that they
draw inspiration from scriptural sources and that they frequently quote from religious
scripture in their attempts to mobilise supporters. In his trial statement, the Jewish reli-
gious extremist Yigal Amir, the murderer of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, said
that he had drawn inspiration from the Biblical precedent of Jael, who killed the Philis-
tine warlord Sisera (Peri 2000). The symbol of the priest Phineas, who killed to prevent
immoral acts, was invoked on numerous occasions by American terrorists to sanction
attacks against abortion clinics or FBI buildings (Pratt 2010). In Al Qaida’s ‘Declaration
of Jihad on the Americans Occupying the Country of the Two Sacred Places’, issued in
August 1996, Osama Bin Laden cites Islamic scripture numerous times, for instance,
this verse from the Quran: ‘But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and
slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seise them, beleaguer them, and lie in
wait for them in every stratagem (of war)’ [Al Tawbah: 5].2 These are not isolated
examples. Among a collection of 2,000 texts written by Islamic extremists to legitimize
attacks or to mobilise supporters, about three quarters refer to parts of scripture that
condone or prescribe violence (Halverson, Furlow, and Corman 2012).
Whether such references to scripture by prominent religious extremists can actually
motivate support for violence among broader target populations or not is open to aca-
demic and political debate (see Dawson 2018, 2019). However, the fact that leaders and
recruiters of extremist movements make frequent use of references to religious scripture
in their attempts to rally support demonstrates that they believe in the mobilising power
of scripture. To investigate whether this belief is justified, we implemented a survey
experiment among 8,000 Christian, Muslim, and Jewish respondents in seven countries
situated across North America, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa – namely the United
States, Germany, Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, and Kenya. This set of countries
offers a broad basis for generalisations about the capacity of references to religious scrip-
ture to mobilise support for religious violence, not just because of its broad geographical
scope, but also because it covers countries where the various religious groups are in a
minority or majority position, as well as where they derive from migration or are of
native origin. Our study is moreover the first to explore the causal role of violence legit-
imations in religious scripture on attitudes towards religious violence in a comparative
perspective across the three Abrahamic religions. Our findings show that priming indi-
viduals with isomorphic pro-violence quotes from the Bible, Torah, or the Quran raises
attitudinal support for religious violence significantly across all three religious groups
and in widely varying country settings. Effect sizes are particularly large among
Muslims in our sample, and among those with a fundamentalist, literalist conception
of their religion.
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Theory and research questions
A variety of scholars are skeptical about the notion that religious motivations or ideology
play a causal role in explaining religious violence. Rather, they point to economic grie-
vances (e.g. Gurr 2006; Mousseau 2011; Piazza 2011), political marginalisation (e.g. Par-
geter 2009; Della Porta 2013), overlapping social identities (e.g. Basedau, Vüllers, and
Körner 2013), or psychological trauma (e.g. Speckhard and Ahkmedova 2006) as salient
determinants. The declared religious motivations of terrorists have been questioned as a
legitimising cover for other power or profit-driven purposes (e.g. Stern 2003). As
Dawson (2019, 80) has noted, ‘the entire discussion of religious terrorism is permeated
by a subtle yet significant conceptual bias against accepting religion as a sui generis
source of motivation, born perhaps of the secular backgrounds and training of most ter-
rorism scholars’. Indeed, sociologists of religion have been more willing to consider reli-
gious ideology, especially in its fundamentalist guise, as a prime motivational force. Bruce
(2000) argues that references to religious scripture should not be dismissed and that the
prioritisation of religious identity indeed drives individuals to commit violence (similarly
Juergensmeyer 2007). This debate about the relevance of religion as a motivational force
has been difficult to resolve with observational data from biographical interviews and
cross-sectional surveys because of the inherent difficulty of distinguishing true motivations
from (post-hoc) justifications (Dawson 2019, 78). Experimental evidence would allow
more confident causal conclusions. Bushman et al. (2007) have shown that individuals
in Christian societies exposed to God-sanctioned biblical accounts of violence are more
likely to display aggressive behaviour, especially if they believe in God. Apart from the
latter study, which was conducted with students only, we are not aware of any other
research that has experimentally investigated the impact of exposure to scriptural
content on violence support.
The holy books of all three monotheistic religions—Islam, Christianity, and Judaism –
contain various verses that legitimate violence against individuals who commit acts against
the true faith. These verses ostracise atheists, apostates, and adulterers, to name but a few.
By confronting believers in a controlled experimental design with such violence-legitimising
verses, we investigate whether they have the potential to raise levels of support for religious
violence, as extremist recruiters apparently believe they do. In additionwe askwhether adher-
ents of the threeAbrahamic religions react similarlywhen encountering calls to violencebased
on scripture, and whether the mobilising power of scriptural violence legitimations differs
across types of believers. To this latter end, we investigate three moderator variables that
tap into different aspects of religiosity: observance, knowledge, and fundamentalism.
In line with the idea that violence is contrary to the true nature of religion, some have
claimed that perpetrators and supporters of violence are found primarily among those
who are less religiously observant and less knowledgeable about the content of scripture.
Religiously observant and knowledgeable individuals may be able to counterbalance scrip-
tural legitimations of violence with knowledge of other parts of religious practice or scrip-
ture that instruct believers toward tolerance and peacefulness (e.g. Wiktorowicz 2005; Neo
et al. 2017). However, susceptibility to extremist mobilisation might also be higher among
those who are religiously observant and knowmore about their religious tradition, because
to them religion is more salient and scripture more meaningful. Empirical evidence on this
question is rare, mostly non-experimental, and inconclusive. In a study among
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Palestinians, Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan (2009) found a positive relationship
between mosque attendance and support for suicide attacks, but no such relationship
with the frequency of prayer.3 Graeme et al. (2013) studied the role of knowledge of
Islam – measured by factual questions about religious scripture and doctrine that have
unambiguous answers, such as the percentage of income that Muslims are required to
give as alms (zakat) – among Pakistani Muslims and found that more knowledge was
associated, though not very strongly, with lower support for several Islamist terror
groups. On the basis of in-depth interviews and long-term observation of IS-activists,
Wood (2016) however shows that they often possess detailed knowledge of Quranic
and other religious source texts, which they use to legitimize their apocalyptic version
of Islamism. By studying the role of religious observance and knowledge in an experimen-
tal setting and across various religious groups and contexts, we aim to provide more sys-
tematic evidence on the question whether observant believers and those who know more
about the content of scripture are more or less likely to be swayed by mobilisation attempts
that refer to scriptural legitimations of violence.
Alternatively, it might be not so much the degree but the type of religiosity – moderate
or fundamentalist – that matters. Religious fundamentalist ideology has been widely held
responsible for driving extremist violence, but empirical evidence on the matter is scarce.
Previous research has mainly focused on Christian fundamentalism and has found it to be
strongly associated with negative attitudes towards out-groups such as homosexuals (e.g.
Laythe et al. 2002), adherents of other religions (e.g. Glock and Stark 1966; Altemeyer
2003), and racial and ethnic minorities (e.g. Eisinga, Konig, and Scheepers 1995). A
smaller number of studies have also established the relationship between religious funda-
mentalism and outgroup hostility among Muslims (Hunsberger 1996; Hunsberger,
Owusu, and Duck 1999; Koopmans 2015). However, while a connection between funda-
mentalist religiosity and support for religious violence is frequently posited in theoretical
and descriptive studies of religious extremism, there is a lack of rigorous empirical inves-
tigations of this relationship (see Rogers et al. 2007). It seems plausible, however, that the
hostile attitudes towards out-groups that are strongly associated with fundamentalism
lower the barrier towards support for violence against proclaimed enemies of the faith.
Moreover, one of the defining features of fundamentalism is a belief in the literal interpret-
ation of scripture (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992, 118). We therefore expect religious
fundamentalists to be particularly susceptible to mobilisation attempts by extremists
who present them with scriptural instructions and legitimations for the use of violence.
Another central finding from the literature on religious fundamentalism and out-group
hostility highlights religious fundamentalism as the decisive aspect of religiosity that drives
prejudice. Once fundamentalism is controlled, most studies among Christians find that
religious observance or other measures of the degree of religiosity do not influence out-
group hostility (e.g. Kirkpatrick, Hood, and Hartz 1991; Altemeyer and Hunsberger
1992). A comparative study among Christians and Muslims found that for the latter
the effect of religiosity on outgroup hostility does not disappear entirely after controlling
for fundamentalism, although it is strongly reduced in size (Koopmans 2015, 49). Based on
this discussion, we will test all three aspects of religiosity – religious observance, religious
knowledge, and religious fundamentalism – simultaneously to investigate whether reli-
gious fundamentalism emerges as the primary driver of support for violence.
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Data and experimental verification strategy
To ascertain a high level of external validity, we used stratified telephone, face-to-face, and in
one case an online survey on religion and society among over 8,000 Christian, Muslim, and
Jewish respondents in seven countries. Religious groups that are a in minority position in a
particular country (e.g. Muslims in Kenya or Jews in the United States) were oversampled.
Table A1 in the Appendix shows respondent numbers by religious group and country. There
are a total number of 3007 Christian, 1018 Jewish, and 4064 Muslim respondents in the
sample. The sample sizes per country range from 843 respondents in Palestine to 1357
respondents in Cyprus. In Lebanon, we additionally used quotas to ensure that the
sample adequately represented the various denominations within Islam (Shiite and
Sunni) and Christianity (Maronite andMelkite Catholics, Eastern Orthodox and Protestant)
in the country. Likewise, the Jewish sample in Israel is representative for the various strands
within Israeli Judaism (secular, traditional, orthodox and ultra-orthodox). In all countries,
gender and age quotas were enforced. All surveys were done nationwide, except in Kenya
where this was not feasible and the sample is based on the two largest cities, Nairobi and
Mombasa, as well as two rural regions, one predominantly Muslim (Malindi), another pre-
dominantly Christian (Nakuru). Religious group membership was determined based on the
self-identification of the respondents by way of the question ‘To which religion do you
belong?’. Respondents indicating no religious affiliation or, in very few cases, affiliation to
another religion (e.g. Hinduism), were dropped from the analysis. The survey included ques-
tions about religious observance, fundamentalism, religious knowledge and socio-economic
status. More information about the survey design can be found in the Online Appendix 2.
At the end of the survey, respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment or a
control condition (for balance checks, see Figure S1 in the Online Appendix 1). The treat-
ment condition provided a legitimation for the use of lethal violence in the name of reli-
gion, which was based on two isomorphic scriptural verses found in the Bible and Torah
book Deuteronomy (verse 17: 2–5) and in the Quran Surah 5, Al Mai’dah (verse 33). In the
treatment condition, respondents were primed with the following true statement:
According to the [Christian respondent: Bible Book Deuteronomy / Jewish respondent:
Torah Book Deuteronomy / Muslim respondent: Quran, Surah 5, Al Ma’idah], those who
cause mischief and do evil in the eyes of God should be killed.
In the control condition, individuals were not assigned any prime. Individuals in both the
treatment and control conditions were then asked the following question: ‘What do you
personally think? Should people who cause mischief and do evil in the eyes of God be
killed?’ The answer options, scored on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranged from ‘completely dis-
agree’ to ‘completely agree’. By comparing outcomes in treatment and control conditions,
we test whether references to violence-legitimising scriptural sources increase target audi-
ence support for the use of violence against the null hypothesis that believers’ attitudes
towards violence remain unaffected by such attempts to mobilise support for violence.
As an alternative to the no-prime control group, we considered a placebo group that
received a prime referring to ‘some people’, which we included in the US study. The idea
behind this placebo was that perhaps even a maximally neutral reference to some outside
source of legitimation such as ‘some people’ would already increase individuals’ support
for religious violence. If that were the case, an increase in violence support in the treatment
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condition would not be attributable to religious legitimation specifically but to the presence
of any kind of outside legitimation. In this condition, respondents received the following
question: ‘According to some people, those who cause mischief and do evil in the eyes of
God should be killed. What do you personally think? Should people who cause mischief
and do evil in the eyes of God be killed?’ Results of the US study indicated that this
prime was not perceived as neutral and lowered rather than raised support for violence com-
pared to both the no-prime and religious treatment conditions (see Online Appendix 1
Figure S2). That respondents lowered rather than increased their endorsement of violence
when primed with violence support by ‘some people’ suggests that they probably thought
of people belonging to different religions or denominations than their own. We conclude
from this that priming with another legitimising source or agent – even if formulated as neu-
trally as possible – cannot be considered as a control or placebo condition but rather con-
stitutes a treatment in its own right. We did not use the ‘some people’ treatment in the other
country surveys and use the question without any priming as the control condition, which
gives the level of support for violence in the absence of any legitimising prime.
We measure religious observance by two practices that are central to all three Abraha-
mic religions: praying at least once a day and visiting a house of worship (church, mosque
or synagogue) at least once a week. However, in Islam and Judaism visiting the mosque or
synagogue is less central to observance for women. Therefore, we count covering the hair
as an alternative form of observance for women who indicate that they do not regularly
visit a mosque or synagogue. As a robustness test, we also operationalise religious obser-
vance in exactly the same way for men and women, without considering covering. The
results have been included in the Online Appendix of the paper and do not deviate in sub-
stantively relevant ways from our main findings (see Online Appendix 1 Figure S3).
Religious knowledge is measured by the number of correct answers to three pretested
multiple-choice questions on the content of the Bible, Torah and Quran that have unam-
biguous correct answers. One of these, the name of the son that God instructed Abraham
to sacrifice, is common to all three religions; the other two questions are religion-specific.
For instance, we asked Christians what happened on Pentecost and Muslims where the
Mi’raj (Mohammed’s ascent to heaven) took place (full question wordings and answer
options can be found in the Appendix at the end of the paper). Finally, religious funda-
mentalism is operationalised by a scale (with a Cronbach’s alpha value of .80) composed
of eight well-established items that include the literal and unalterable interpretation of
scripture (‘There is only one correct interpretation of the [Bible/Qur’an/Torah] to
which every [Christian/Muslim/Jew] should stick’), the superiority of one’s own faith
(‘[Christianity/Islam/Judaism] is superior to other religions’), and the precedence of reli-
gious prescriptions over secular laws (‘The rules of the [Bible/Quran/Torah] are more
important to me than the current laws of [survey country]’). Full wordings of all eight
items can be found in the Appendix at the end of the paper (see Altemeyer and Hunsber-
ger 1992; Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007; Roex, van Stiphout, and Tillie 2010; Koopmans
2015). It is important to note that the use of violence as a means to attain religious
aims is not included in the definition of fundamentalism, nor in the items by which it
is measured. Appendix A at the end of the paper gives the exact wording and answer
options of all questions as well as summary statistics for the three religious moderator vari-
ables (see Online Appendix 2 for the exact wording and answer options of the questions
regarding the control variables). For the multivariate analyses reported in Table 1 below
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we additionally controlled for gender, age (in years), education (a 7-point scale based on
the International Standard Classification of Education – ISCED), and income (measured
across 16 income brackets in the US and across 7 income brackets in the other survey
countries). Because different currencies and income levels were used in the different
countries, we standardise income by country. Not all respondents wanted to share their
income with us (18.6% of respondents) and therefore we also include a variable for
missing income information in the multivariate regressions. Table A2 in the Appendix
shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis.
Because the status of scripture, and the levels and meaning of observance, religious
knowledge and fundamentalism may differ across the three religious traditions, we
report analyses both for the full sample, and for the three religious groups separately.
Treatment main effects of scriptural violence legitimation
We start by looking at the treatment main effect, overall and by religious group and
country. Because the treatment was randomly assigned we can measure the treatment
Table 1. Multivariate regression of violence support on treatment, religiosity, and control variables.
Dependent variable: Support for violence
Entire sample Christian Jewish Muslim
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.33*** 0.15*** 0.09 0.42***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05)




Religious observance −0.01 −0.03 −0.13* 0.08*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Religious knowledge −0.07*** −0.06* −0.23*** −0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Religious fundamentalism 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.41*** 0.30***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Religious observance × treatment 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.06
(0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
Religious knowledge × treatment 0.07** 0.02 0.13 0.10*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Religious fundamentalism × treatment 0.17*** 0.09* 0.04 0.26***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Age −0.002* −0.005*** −0.002 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.02 −0.07+ −0.02 0.09*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Education −0.06*** −0.07** 0.05 −0.08***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Income −0.03* −0.04 −0.05 −0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Income Missing 0.05 −0.05 −0.12 0.18**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,263 2,770 959 3,534
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.20 0.32 0.29
Notes: The table shows standardised coefficients from OLS regressions (with standard errors in parentheses) of the entire
sample (column 1) and each included religious group (columns 2–4).The coefficients for observance, knowledge, funda-
mentalism, education and income are standardised. See Online Appendix 1 Table S1 for the full regression table including
the country fixed effects coefficients; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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effect simply by the difference between the treatment and control groups. The reported
significance levels are therefore computed by way of OLS regressions without any
control variables. In Figure 1, panel A, we plot the percentage of respondents who
agreed or completely agreed (scores 4 and 5 on the five-point scale) that those who
cause mischief and do evil in the eyes of God should be killed, by religious group and treat-
ment or control condition. The results demonstrate that there is a consistent and fairly
strong effect of priming individuals with scriptural quotes on violence legitimisation.
On average across all religious groups and countries, 18 percent of respondents supported
the use of violence in the control condition, compared to 30 percent in the treatment con-
dition with the scriptural prime (significant at p < .001, see Online Appendix 1 Table S2).
The figure also reveals important differences across the three religious groups, both
regarding baseline levels of support for violence in the control condition, and regarding
the size of the treatment effect. Among Jews and Christians, baseline levels are low, at
three and nine percent, respectively. For both groups, support for violence in the treatment
condition is significantly higher (at p < .05) but the increase is modest in size, to seven and
twelve percent, respectively. Among Muslims, baseline levels are higher (29 percent
support for violence) and they increase strongly to 47 percent in the treatment condition
(p < .001).
Figure 1. Support for religious violence (in % of respondents) in control and treatment groups by reli-
gious group (panel A) and by religious group and country (panel B) (Error bars represent the standard
error and the numbers above the bars indicate the level of violence support).
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Because religious groups are not distributed equally across the seven countries, we
present in panel B of Figure 1 results for each country separately.4 Although we find
strong cross-country level differences, the basic pattern of panel A is replicated within
countries. In every country where Muslims and Christians can be compared –
Germany, Cyprus, the USA, Lebanon, and Kenya – baseline levels of support for violence
are higher among Muslims and in all but one case – Lebanon – they also increase more
strongly in the treatment condition. In the two countries where Jews and Muslims can
be compared – Israel and the United States – baseline support as well as the treatment
effect are stronger among Muslims. We thus establish that priming respondents with a
scriptural legitimation for violence is an effective strategy to mobilise support for violence
for all three religions, but most strongly so for Muslims.
Religious observance, knowledge, and fundamentalism as moderators
To what extent is the treatment effect homogenous across different degrees and types of
religiosity? Panel A of Figure 2 shows levels of support for violence in the control and
treatment conditions by religious group and levels of observance. High observance is
defined as both praying daily and worshipping weekly (praying daily and worshipping
Figure 2. Support for religious violence (in % of respondents) in control and treatment groups by reli-
gious group for different levels of religious observance (panel A), religious knowledge (panel B), and
religious fundamentalism (panel C) (Error bars represent the standard error and the numbers above
the bars indicate the level of violence support).
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weekly or covering the hair for women). This applies to 42% of Christians, 58% of Muslims
and 19% of Jews in our sample. Across both the control and treatment conditions, obser-
vant believers in all three religions exhibit higher support for violence (p < .001 for Chris-
tians and Muslims; p < .05 for Jews; see Online Appendix 1 Table S3). Among Muslims
there is, moreover, a significant interaction effect: Highly observant Muslims react more
strongly to the treatment (p < .05). As a result, the highest levels of support for violence
(58%) are found among highly observant Muslims in the treatment condition, while the
lowest support levels occur among Jews with low observance levels in the control con-
dition (3%). We therefore conclude that religious observance does not inhibit support
for religious violence. Among Muslims, it is even associated with greater susceptibility
to persuasion by scriptural legitimations of violence.
We next examine religious knowledge, which does not necessarily coincide with obser-
vance. While the two are positively correlated, the correlation is weak (r = .19; p < .001)
and of a similar magnitude within the three religions. Panel B of Figure 2 shows levels of
support for violence in the control and treatment conditions across religious groups, con-
trasting those with high and low religious knowledge. Because the number of correct
answers to the three quiz questions was higher among the Jewish group, we adjust for poten-
tial differences in item difficulty across religions by putting the threshold for high knowledge
at three correct answers for Jews and at two correct answers for Christians and Muslims.
Thus defined, 62% of Christians, 71% of Muslims, and 72% of Jews were classified as
having high religious knowledge. As the results in Figure 2 show there are different patterns
for the three religious groups. Among Jews, high religious knowledge is associated with
lower support for violence (p < .001, see Online Appendix 1 Table S4) and among Christians
there is no significant difference between those with low and high knowledge levels. Highly
knowledgeableMuslims are, however, significantly more supportive of the use of violence (p
< .001). As a result, the highest level of violence support occurs among Muslims with high
scriptural knowledge in the treatment condition (52%), the lowest support is found among
Jews with high scriptural knowledge in the control condition (1%). From the results of reli-
gious observance and knowledge combined, we can conclude that support for violence is
only weakly and ambiguously related to religiosity among Christians and Jews. Christian
and Jewish observance somewhat raises support for violence, but religious knowledge is
unrelated to support for violence for Christians, and among Jews it even acts as an antidote.
Among Muslims, however, both indicators of religiosity point in the same direction: obser-
vant and knowledgeable Muslims are more likely to endorse violence, and, as indicated by
the significant interaction effect with the experimental treatment, observant Muslims are
more receptive to the mobilisation of support for violence by way of scriptural references
than less observant Muslims.
Panel C of Figure 2 shows support for violence across control and treatment conditions
by religious group, contrasting fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist believers. We
define fundamentalists as those believers who agree with the majority of the fundament-
alism items (i.e. five or more of the eight items). By this operationalisation, 32 percent of
Christians, 49 percent of Muslims, and 16 percent of Jews in our sample qualify as funda-
mentalists. Kenyan Muslims have the highest share of fundamentalists (80%), German
Christians (9%) the lowest. Within every country, Muslims display higher levels of funda-
mentalism than Christians and/or Jews, with the exception of Lebanon, where the share of
fundamentalists is higher among Christians (53% compared to 43% among Muslims).
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Religious fundamentalism is only weakly related to religious knowledge (r = .06 overall; p
< .001) with little variation across the three religious groups. Fundamentalists do however
tend to be strongly observant (r = .52 overall; p < .001; ranging from .39 amongMuslims to
.67 among Jews).
The bivariate relationship between fundamentalism and support for violence depicted
in Panel C of Figure 2 is strong and clear-cut. In all three religious groups, support for
violence in the control condition is at least twice as high among fundamentalist believers
(p < .01 for Christians; p < .001 for Jews and Muslims, see Online Appendix Table 1 S5).
The treatment effect is also stronger among fundamentalists of all three persuasions, but
the interaction is not significant for Jews. For Muslims (p < .01) and Christians (p < .05),
however, there is a strong interaction effect. Fundamentalism is thus clearly related to
support for violence and the relationship is most pronounced among Muslims. Funda-
mentalists are also, as we expected, more easily swayed by references to violence-legitimis-
ing quotes from scriptural sources.
The results for religious observance and fundamentalism (panels A and C of Figure 2)
are quite similar, and, given that the two are also strongly correlated, this raises the ques-
tion which of the two is the decisive aspect of religiosity that drives support for violence.
Religious knowledge is also moderately correlated with observance and fundamentalism,
so here too the question is whether the results persist if we control for the other two aspects
of religiosity.
Table 1 shows the result of multivariate analyses including not only the three aspects of
religiosity, i.e. religious observance, religious knowledge, and religious fundamentalism
(using the original scale of response options rather than the dichotomised scores we
used for the Figures 1 and 2 above), but also a range of covariates (age, gender, education,
income).5 To allow a comparison of the size of the coefficients the three religiosity vari-
ables as well as education and income were standardised. As indicated above, we addition-
ally include a variable for missing income information. Because we include in the
multivariate model interactions of the treatment with the three standardised religiosity
variables, the treatment coefficient in the regression represents the effect of the treatment
at mean values of observance, knowledge, and fundamentalism. Bearing this in mind, we
observe a positive treatment effect on violence support among all three religious groups,
which among Christians and Muslims is highly significant (p < .001) and particularly
large in size among Muslims (0.42 points on the 5-point scale of the dependent variable,
which amounts to one third of a standard deviation for the Muslim subsample). Among
Jews, the treatment effect is not significant. However, – as shown in Figure 1 above –when
we measure the treatment effect across the whole range of observations – and not just as
here at mean values of the religiosity variables – it is also significant among Jews.
The results for the religious group variables (with Christians as the reference category)
indicate that once we control for the three aspects of religiosity and background variables
there is no difference between levels of support for violence between Jews and Christians.
Violence support among Muslims is however considerably higher (p < .001) even at
similar levels and types of religiosity and among respondents with similar demographic
and socio-economic characteristics. Substantively, the Muslim coefficient of 0.62
amounts to half a standard deviation of violence support. We discuss possible reasons
for this difference between Muslims on the one hand, and Jews and Christians on the
other, in the conclusion.
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Turning now to the religiosity variables, the results show that only for Muslims a sig-
nificant (B = .08; p < .05) but much reduced positive main effect of religious observance
remains, whereas for Jews observance even becomes, contrary to the bivariate results,
negatively associated with support for violence (B =−.13; p < .05). The interaction terms
show that the treatment effect is unaffected by levels of religious observance across all
three religious groups. Unlike the bivariate results, where religious knowledge was not sig-
nificantly associated with violence in the experimental control group among Christians
and positively associated among Muslims, the multivariate results show religious knowl-
edge to be negatively related to support for violence across all three religious groups, and
significantly so for Christians (B =−.06; p < .05) and Jews (B =−.23; p < .001). We find,
however, that religiously knowledgeable Muslims react more strongly to the scriptural
treatment by raising their violence support, although substantively this effect is not very
large (B = .10; p < .05). Religious fundamentalism, finally, clearly appears as the type of
religiosity most consistently and strongly related to violence support. Fundamentalism
is highly positively related to violence support (p < .001 for all three religious groups),
and most strongly so among Jews (B = .41) and Muslims (B = .30). As the interaction
terms show, fundamentalists also consistently react more strongly to the treatment, and
significantly so among Christians (B = .09; p < .05) and Muslims (B = .26; p < .001). Fun-
damentalist ideology, and not religious observance or knowledge, is the main driving
force behind support for religious violence.
Another way of looking at the importance of variables tapping religion and religiosity in
explaining violence support is comparing their effect sizes to those of demographic and
socio-economic background variables. We find that older people tend to be less supportive
of violence, although the coefficient is only significant among Christians. We do not find a
consistent relationship with gender. Education is negatively related to violence support
among Christians and Muslims, but not among Jews. Income effects also point in a nega-
tive direction but are comparatively weak. Comparing the coefficients of the control and
religiosity variables shows that the impact of fundamentalism on violence support is
several times stronger. For instance, among Muslims the effect size of a one standard devi-
ation increase in fundamentalism is almost four times that of a standard deviation increase
in education and ten times that of a one standard deviation increase in income.
Conclusions
Using an experimental design, we have shown that referring to scriptural passages that
legitimize and prescribe violence against enemies of the faith increases support for reli-
gious violence in a sample of seven countries and across three religions. Scholarship to
date has sought to understand the success of religious extremist movements. Our
results underline why these groups so frequently draw on scriptural sources in their mobil-
isation and legitimation attempts. The reference to scripture has a particularly potent
effect on Muslims. The question is why this is the case. An important part of the
answer is that there is a strong connection between religious fundamentalism and
support for violence. As our results demonstrate, fundamentalist ideology is more wide-
spread amongMuslims in our countries of study and this is an important part of the expla-
nation for the higher average levels of support for religious violence among Muslims and
their greater susceptibility to persuasion by scriptural references. Compared to
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fundamentalism, the role of religious observance and knowledge in understanding vio-
lence support is relatively minor. Interestingly, however, scriptural knowledge makes
Muslim believers somewhat more likely to respond to the scriptural treatment with
increased levels of violence support.
One could argue that enhanced agreement to violence after being exposed to the scrip-
tural quote is driven not so much by true support for the use of violence but by a desire to
appear as a goodMuslim, Christian or Jew. This would however not explain the differences
we find across the religions, because we may assume that all believers want to appear as
good Christians, Muslims or Jews. It also does not explain the strong relationship to fun-
damentalism. We find that it is primarily fundamentalists who are strongly swayed by
attempts to legitimize violence by way of scriptural references. Again, it does not seem
plausible to assume that non-fundamentalists would not want to appear as good believers,
especially since we control for other aspects of religiosity. In the end, what our experimen-
tal treatment does is to highlight violence-endorsing parts of scripture and we show that
only certain types of believers are swayed by such references to express stronger support
for violence, whereas other types of believers do not alter their attitudes compared to the
control condition, or do so much less strongly. Even if a desire to appear as a ‘good’
believer might play a role, believers apparently differ quite strongly on the question
which position a good believer should take and whether or not that position can
deviate from literal scripture.
While we do not believe that the fact that our results are most pronounced for Muslims
is related to intrinsic features of Islam or of its scriptural sources, our experiment does not
allow us to reject this possibility. However, we consider this reading less plausible as
violent passages are also plentiful in the Bible and Torah, and conversely there are
many passages in the Quran that contain calls for peace and tolerance. A key difference
between the believers of the three religions, however, is their degree of recent exposure
to fundamentalist and extremist cognitive mobilisation that has propagated the idea of lit-
eralist interpretation and has selectively raised the salience of those parts of Islamic scrip-
ture that legitimate violence. Since the late 1970s Islamic fundamentalist movements and
regimes have been on the rise across the Islamic world, and Saudi Arabia, Iran and the
Persian Gulf states have spent billions of dollars of their oil revenues to diffuse their
respective versions of Islamic fundamentalism across the world (e.g. Shane 2016;
Wilson 2017). This provides a plausible reason why in the current situation Muslims
are more inclined to support violence in the control condition (which reflects the
cumulative effect of past mobilisation by religious extremists) and are also more easily
persuaded by references to violence-legitimising scriptural content.
The evidence we have put forward has important consequences for policy. It follows
that extremist religious movements and regimes cannot be effectively combated if their
religious roots and the motivational power of scriptural justifications for violence are
not taken seriously. Shying away from confronting what is religious about religious extre-
mism deflects attention from the need to also find religious answers to the phenomenon.
Our research suggests that a pro-active, publicly mobilised counter-discourse against fun-
damentalist belief systems and against literalist interpretations of scripture might be
necessary to effectively break the mobilising power of religious extremists. Our results
regarding religious knowledge indicate that raising factual knowledge about scriptural
content is not likely to be an effective strategy against religiously motivated violence if
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it is not accompanied by measures to counteract the fundamentalist interpretation of that
content. In view of the key importance of fundamentalist literalism as a moderator vari-
able, follow-up research could investigate the efficacy of different strategies aimed at alter-
ing the way in which believers perceive and interpret scriptural texts.
Notes
1. See the Global Terrorism Database of the University of Maryland; available at: https://www.
start.umd.edu/data-tools/global-terrorism-database-gtd.
2. Osama Bin Laden. Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two
Holiest Sites. Available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/harmony-program/declaration-of-jihad-
against-the-americans-occupying-the-land-of-the-two-holiest-sites-original-language-2/.
3. This paper also reports on a small supplementary study among Jews that experimentally shows
that priming respondents with a question about their synagogue attendance raises support for
religious violence, whereas priming with a question about prayer frequency does not.
4. Christians in the Israeli and Palestinian samples are not shown in the figure because their
numbers are too low for statistically meaningful conclusions. They are however included
in the multivariate regressions in Table 1 below.
5. Results including the country fixed effects coefficients can be found in Online Appendix 1,
Table S1.
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Appendix A
Sample and key questionnaire items
Table A1. Sample distribution across countries and religious groups.
Cyprus Germany Israel Kenya Lebanon Palestine USA Total
Christian 684 765 64 600 491 32 371 3007
(8.5%) (9.5%) (0.8%) (7.4%) (6.1%) (0.4%) (4.6%) (37.2%)
Jewish 0 0 805 0 0 0 213 1018
(0%) (0%) (10.0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (2.6%) (12.6%)
Muslim 673 516 343 597 699 811 425 4064
(8.3%) (6.4%) (4.2%) (7.4%) (8.6%) (10.0%) (5.3%) (50.2%)
Total 1357 1281 1212 1197 1190 843 1009 8089
(16.8%) (15.8%) (15.0%) (14.8%) (14.7%) (10.4%) (12.5%) (100%)
Table A2. Descriptive statistics.




































across 8 items on
a 5-point Likert
scale)









2 = both forms
of observance)
8055 0.0 2.0 34 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.4 0.8
Age (in years) 8089 18.0 95.0 0 39.3 16.4 42.6 18.1 40.4 15.1 36.5 14.8
Male 8089 0.0 1.0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Education (0 = no
education; 7 =
Master degree)






8089 −2.1 5.2 0 −0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.9 −0.0 0.9
Income missing 8089 0.0 1.0 1508 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
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Question wordings and answer options for dependent and moderator variables
Dependent variables:
Support for religious violence. Control condition:








[for Christians and Jews:] According to the [Bible/Torah] Book Deuteronomy, those who cause
mischief and do evil in the eyes of God, should be killed
[for Muslims:] According to the Quran, Surah 5, Al Ma’idah, those who cause mischief and do
evil in the eyes of Allah, should be killed








Religious observance. How often do you pray?





How often do you visit a religious service in a [Mosque / Church / Synagogue]?
(1) Several times a day
(2) Daily
(3) Weekly
(4) Rarely / on special occasions
(5) Never
[for Jewish and Muslim women who indicate they rarely or never visit a synagogue or mosque]
Do you express your faith in your daily life in any of the following ways?
– Covering your hair
(1) Yes
(2) No
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Religious knowledge. All respondents
What was the name of the son that [Abraham / Ibrahim] offered as a sacrifice to God?
(1) Isaac / Ismail / Ismāʿīl
(2) Jacob / Yakub / Yaʿqūb
(3) Jonas / Yunus / Yunus
(4) Josef / Yusuf / Yousef
Muslims






Where did the Mi’raj take place?
(1) Mecca
(2) Medina
(3) Al Quds (Jerusalem)
(4) Damascus
Christians
What happened on Pentecost?
(1) Jesus stood up from the grave
(2) The disciples received the Holy Spirit
(3) Jesus walked on water
(4) The last supper
Christians
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Religious fundamentalism. All items were measured using a five point Likert scale
(1) Completely agree
(2) Agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree
(5) Completely disagree
The rules of the [Quran / Bible / Torah] are more important to me than the current laws of
[survey country]
[Islam / Christianity / Judaism] is superior to other religions
What we are seeing in the world today is the final battle between [Islam / Christianity / Judaism]
and the forces of evil
There is only one correct interpretation of the [Quran / Bible / Torah] to which every [Muslim/
Christian/Jew] should stick
Whenever science and the [Quran / Bible / Torah] conflict, science is probably right
Those who do not strictly follow the rules prescribed in the [Quran / Bible / Torah] can no
longer be called [Muslims / Christians / Jews]
There is only one perfectly true religion
It is more important to be a good person than to have the right religion
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